

Message Text

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S E C R E T STATE 103438

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR YOUNG FROM UNA

FOLLOWING REPEAT BELGRADE 3144 ACTION SECSTATE DATED APRIL 21, 1978.

QUOTE: S E C R E T BELGRADE 3144

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PORG CU SO YO

SUBJECT: CUBA IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: ROLE OF THE NON-ALIGNED
MOVEMENT

REF: STATE 095195

1. SUMMARY: DURING HOUR-LONG SESSION WITH FONSEC MINIC APR 19,
AMB DREW ON POINTS IN REFTEL TO REVIEW US CONCERNS REGARDING
CUBAN ACTIVITIES IN HORN WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO NON-ALIGNED
MOVEMENT (NAM). STATING THAT US WAS NEITHER INSERTING ITSELF
IN PURELY NA AFFAIRS NOR TRYING TO PROVOKE YUGOSLAVIA INTO
ANTI-CUBAN ACTIVITY, AMB STRESSED THAT USG WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED
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OVER CUBAN INTENTIONS AND WISHED GOY TO BE AWARE OF THIS.

2. IN COURSE OF LENGTHY RESPONSE, MINIC SAID GOY ALSO SEIZED
WITH ISSUES RAISED BY AMB AND HAS BEEN CONDUCTING A "CONTINUOUS
DIALOGUE" WITH CUBA. MINIC WAS CLEARLY UNHAPPY WITH CUBANS AND
APOLOGETIC TO AMB IN EXPLAINING THAT TITO IN WASHINGTON WOULD
NOT ADMIT TO PRESENCE OF CUBAN GROUND FORCES IN ETHIOPIA BECAUSE
OF CUBAN "ASSURANCES" TO THE CONTRARY. HE INDICATED THAT
CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN OGADEN IS EXPLAINABLE IN TERMS OF
ASSISTANCE AGAINST OUTSIDE AGRESSION. HOWEVER, CUBAN

INTERVENTION IN ERITREA WOULD BE "DIFFERENT" BECAUSE IT COULD ATTRACT ARAB STATE SUPPORT FOR THE ERITREANS AND DEVELOP INTO A CONFLICT WHICH COULD SPREAD TO THE ME AND INVOLVE THE SUPERPOWERS. GOY HAS COUNCEILED BOTH THE EPMG AND "THE "THE ERITREANS" TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS LEADING TO THE GRANTING OF FEDERAL STATUS TO ERITREA WITHIN ETHIOPIA, BUT MINIC DID NOT SEEM OPTIMISTIC THAT THIS WOULD COME ABOUT, AT LEAST SOON. TITO HAD WRITTEN TO NUMAYRI URGING THAT SUDAN ATTEMPT TO MEDIATE BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES, BUT AGAIN WITHOUT A GREAT DEGREE OF OPTIMISM. MINIC SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHEHTER SUBJECT WILL BE RAISED DURING KABUL/ BELGRADE NA MTGS BUT NOTED THAT KABUL AGENDA PROVIDES OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL NA STATES TO RAISE WHAT MAY BE OF CONCERN.

3. REGARDING ACTIONS US MIGHT TAKE TO BE OF ASSISTANCE, MINIC SEEMED TO IMPLY THAT WE SHOULD REMAIN ON SIDELINES, SIGGESTING ONLY THAT IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS WITH SOVIETS MIGHT marginally DIMINISH THE DANGER. HOWEVER, IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION WITH AMB, FSFA OFFICIALS ADMITTED THAT CUBAN ACTIONS WERE WORRISOME AND THOUGHT THAT US COULD FEEL FREE TO RAISE DISCREETLY BUT IN WHATEVER MANNER AND WITH WHOM IT DEEMS APPROPRIATE. END SUMMARY.

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4. AMB TOLD MINIC HE HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO DISCUSS WITH MINIC QUESTION OF CUBA, HORN OF AFRICA, AND NON-ALIGNMENT. SINCE GENERAL SUBJECT IS SENSITIVE, HE DID NOT WANT MINIC TO THINK THAT US WAS TRYING TO INVOLVE ITSELF IN PURELY NA AFFAIRS OR THAT IT WAS TRYING TO PROVOKE YUGOSLAVIA TO ACT AGAINST CUBA. AMB STRESSED TO MINIC NEIGHER OF FOREGOING WAS OR IS USG INTENTION. HE SAID HE DECIDED TO RAISE WITH MINIC DESPITE THE SENSITIVITY DUE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP MOST RECENTLY MANIFESTED IN THE TITO-CARTER TALKS AND THE MINIC-VANCE LETTER.

5. AMB SAID IT WAS CLEAR FROM INSTRUCTIONS THAT WASHINGTON IS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE FUTURE CUBAN ACTIONS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA PARTICULARLY REGARDING ERITREA. HE ADDED IT WAS FAIR TO SAY THAT BASED ON THE TITO-CARTER TALKS THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE FAIRLY HARMONIOUS VIEWS ON BOTH QUESTIONS. HE THEN DISCUSSED THE POINTS IN REFTEL, ADDING TWO OTHERS: (A) ESSENTIALLY USG WOULD LIKE MINIC'S ESTIMATE OF NA REACTION SHOULD CUBA PUT FORCES INTO ERITREA AND WHETHER IF NOTHING HAPPENS IN ERITREA, WOULD CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN ETHIOPIA BECOME AN ISSUE IN EITHER KABUL OR BELGRADE; AND (B) AMB "SPEAKING PERSONALLY" REMINDED MINIC OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH PRESIDENT CARTER AND THE USG SATISFIED GOY DESIRES DURING TITO'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON ON THE ENTIRE NA QUESTION, AND SUGGESTED THAT ON THIS BASIS THE USG COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO LOOK FAVORABLY ON NO NA REACTION

IN THE CASE OF A SUBSEQUENT CUBAN-INSPIRED BLOW-UP IN ETHIOPIA.

6. MINIC RESPONDED THAT HE AND THE GOY ARE ALSO SEIZED WITH THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE AMB. WITHIN THE NAM THERE ARE SEVERAL PROBLEMS, SOME OF WHICH WERE DISCUSSED "VERY CANDIDLY" BY TITO AND CARTER AND BY MINIC AND VANCE. FOR YUGOSLAVIA THE NAM CONSTITUTES THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR
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IN MAINTAINING THE BALANCE OF POWER AND STABILITY IN THE WORLD AND THAT DESTRUCTION OF THE NAM WOULD BE TO THE WORLD'S DETRIMENT. FOR THIS REASON YUGOSLAVIA AND OTHER NA EFFORTS ARE CONCENTRATED "ON REVIVING SOLIDARITY AND THE ACTION CAPABILITY" OF THE NAM. AS FAR AS YUGOSLAVIA IS CONCERNED, THIS IS THE PRINCIPLE INTENTION OF BELGRADE AND KABUL MTGS. TO THIS END SEVERAL PROBLEMS ARE FACED, AMONGST WHICH THE MOST SENSITIVE ARE CONFLICTS AMONG THE NA--WHICH HAVE ARISEN AS A RESULT OF COLONIAL PASTS AND DIFFERENCES IN NATIONAL INTERESTS. ON THESE "WE" ARE CONDUCTING CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THE NA AND SEEKING SOLUTIONS. WITH NON-NA COUNTRIES, YUGOSLAVIA IS DISCUSSING SIMILAR QUESTIONS MAKING THE POINT THAT IT IS A BIG MISTAKE TO ORIENT POLICY TOWARD BREAKING UP THE MOVEMENT. OTHER PROBLEMS ARE BEING HANDLED WITHIN THE NAM.

7. MINIC CONTINUED THAT THE PROBLEM OF CUBAN ACTIVITY IS CONTROVERSIAL NOT ONLY WITHIN A BROADER FRAMEWORK BUT ALSO IN THE NAM. HOWEVER, YUGOSLAVIA IS OF THE OPINION THAT ONLY CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION WITHIN THE MOVEMENT CAN PROVIDE A SOLUTION. ANY OTHER PATH WOULD NOT BRING AN ANSWER.

8. HE STATED YUGOSLAVIA HAS A "CONTINUOUS DIALOGUE" WITH CUBA. CUBAN ACTIONS BEGAN AND HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE CONTEXT OF VERY COMPLEX EVENTS, A SITUATION FILLED WITH CONTRADICTIONS WITHIN AFRICA, TURMOIL, REVOLUTIONARY TRANSFORMATIONS, AND IN A SITUATION WHEN "GREAT DIFFERENCES" EMERGED AMONG AFRICAN COUNTRIES. YUGOSLAVIA HAS ASSISTED COUNTRIES WHOSE GOVERNMENT'S HAVE ASKED FOR AID. THIS IS THE "IDENTICAL ARGUMENT WHICH FRANCE USES TO BOMB WESTERN SAHARA AND THE SAME IS TRUE WITH MOBUTU INVITING MOROCCANS AND EGYPTIANS INTO HIS COUNTRY".
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9. IT IS THE SAME PROBLEM, MINIC CONTINUED, WITH CUBA AND SHOULD BE VIEWED ON A BROADER BASIS. OF COURSE, YUGOSLAVIA CANNOT PREDICT WHAT IS TO BE RAISED DURING THE KABUL OR BELGRADE MTGS. THERE ARE SOME 96 PARTICIPANTS IN NA MTGS. THEIR INTERESTS ARE VARIED. A NUMBER ARE CONCERNED WITH

THE CUBAN ISSUE AS IS THE US "BUT TO SOME THE ISSUE IS NOT EVEN INTERESTING". MANY NA COUNTRIES CONSIDER IT QUITE NORMAL FOR A COUNTRY EXPOSED TO AGGRESSION TO APPEAL TO A FRIEND FOR ASSISTANCE. THEREFORE, IT IS HARD TO PREDICT WHAT WILL COME UP AT THE MEETINGS.

10. FOR YUGOSLAVIA, HOWEVER, THERE WILL BE TWO ISSUES OF PRINCIPLE: (A) THE SEARCH FOR A MECHANISM TO FORESTALL OR PREVENT DISPUTES AND CONFLICTS BETWEEN COUNTRIES. GOY DOES NOT KNOW IF AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED ON THIS. NA COUNTRIES ALWAYS UNANIMOUSLY SUPPORT LEIBERATION MOVEMENTS. DIFFERENCES IN IDEOLOGY DO NOT MATTER. "WE" ARE UNANIMOUS IN SUPPORT OF THE ERADICATION OF COLONIALISM. THERE IS SOLIDARITY TODAY IN OPPOSITION TO AGGRESSION. HOWEVER, AGGRESSION BY ONE NA COUNTRY AGAINST ANOTHER RESULTS IN POLARIZATION; (B) QUESTION OF INTERFERENCE OR INTERVENTION OF ANY FORM INTO INTERNAL AFFAIRS. "WE" ARE ALREADY PURSUING BROAD CONSULTATIONS ON ISSUES FOR THE TWO AGENDAS. THE AGENDA FOR KABUL IS FIXED AND FOR BELGRADE PROBABLY WILL BE FIXED AT KABUL. ONE OF THE KEY POINTS TO BE DISCUSSED IS THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC/ POLITICAL SITUATION AND EVERYONE IS FREE TO RAISE WHATEVER IS OF CONCERN.

11. WITH REGARD TO THE CUBAN ROLE IN THE HORN, YUGOSLAVIA'S VIEWS HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED ALREADY DURING DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON. "YOU" WERE CORRECT THAT THE CUBANS HAD TROOPS IN ETHIOPIA WHILE WE THOUGHT THEY ONLY HAD PILOTS. "WE" USUALLY HAVE ACCURATE INFORMATION, BUT THIS WAS A CASE OF "ASSURANCES GIVEN US BY FRIENDS". THIS BEHAVIOR IS UNUSUAL IN SECRET

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VIEW OF THE GOOD RELATIONS (CUBA HAS) WITH YUGOSLAVIA. THE ONLY EXCUSE FOR CUBA LYING TO THE GOY WOULD BE REASONS OF MILITARY SECURITY. MINIC STATED HE WAS TRYING TO EXPLAIN WHY TITO TOLD CARTER THAT THERE WERE NO CUBAN MILITARY UNITS IN ETHIOPIA. "WHEN A NATION IS GIVEN ASSURANCES IT IS APT TO BELIEVE THEM." YUGOSLAVIA HAD THE INFORMATION THAT THERE WERE SOME TROOPS BUT "WHAT COULD IT DO BUT BELIEVE ITS FRIENDS." IT WAS NOT "OUR" INTENTION TO MISLEAD OR TO WATER DOWN CUBA'S INVOLVEMENT.

12. MINIC STATED THE YUGOSLAV POSITION ON SOMALIA'S OGADAN INCURSION IS SIMILAR TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S VIEW. "IT WAS AN HISTORICAL MISTAKE AND NO ONE CAN APPROVE IT." IN THE YUGOSLAV VIEW EVERY COUNTRY MUST DEFEND ITSELF BY ITS OWN RESOURCES AGAINST AGGRESSION. ON THE OTHER HAND, HISTORY SAYS THAT ANY COUNTRY FACED WITH AGGRESSION CAN CALL FOR HELP, AND IT IS HARD TO CONDEMN THOSE PROVIDING THE ASSISTANCE. MINIC STATED HE SAID AS MUCH TO SAID BARRE. OF COURSE, IT IS HARD FOR THE SOMALIS TO ACCEPT THIS AND "I" THINK THEY MAY NEVER BE ABLE TO ACCEPT IT. "THEY HAVE THEIR OWN JUSTICE YARDSTICK. FOR THE SOMALIS, THERE ARE MORE SOMALIS IN

ETHIOPIA, KENYA AND DJIBOUTI THAN IN SOMALIA AND THEY
CONSIDER THEMSELVES A DIVIDED NATION."

13. REGARDING ERITREA, THE YUGOSLAV POSITION IS "DIFFERENT".
ERITREA IS LINKED TO ETHIOPIA BY A UN DECISION. THEY HAVE
FOR SEVERAL DECADES LIVED TOGETHER, EVEN WITH GREAT
DIFFICULTIES. IN MAKING ITS DECISION, THE UN RULED THAT
ETHIOPIA SHOULD GIVE ERITREA FEDERAL STATUS. THE EMPEROR
ACCEPTED THIS BUT LATER BROKE HIS WORD. ACTUALLY THE ERITREAN
MOVEMENT IN THE STRUGGLE CAME INTO EXISTENCE 17 YEARS AGO.
THEREFORE, YUGOSLAVIA HAS ADVISED MENGHISTU AND THE EPMG
TO GRANT FEDERAL STATUS FOR ERITREA. BUT THE PRESENT
ETHIOPIAN LEADERS ARE MILITARY MEN AND "UNITARISTS" AND SAY THAT
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THERE ARE OTHER NATIONS IN ETHIOPIA WHICH WILL DEMAND THE SAME
KIND OF STATUS.

14. HOWEVER, IF "WE" UPHOLD THE PRINCIPLE THAT ETHIOPIA
SHOULD MAINTAIN ITS TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, THEN ERITREA IS
AN INTERNAL PROBLEM. FOR THIS REASON, SINCE THE ARMED
STRUGGLE BEGAN YUGOSLAVIA HAS OPPOSED "OUR" ARAB FRIENDS
FOR SUPPORTING THE SECESSIONISTS. "WE" THINK CUBAN INTERVENTION
IN ERITREA SHOULD NOT TAKE PLACE. THIS WOULD BRING IN THE ARABS
ON THE OTHER SIDE WHICH COULD LEAD TO HOSTILITIES IN THE ME
AND INVOLVE THE SUPERPOWERS.

15. THEREFORE, MINIC CONTINUED, ON HIS RECENT TRIP TO
AFRICA HE STOPPED OFF IN THE SUDAN TO ENCOURAGE NUMAYRI
TO UNDERTAKE A MEDIATING ROLE AND TO ACT VERY QUICKLY IN
THIS REGARD. IN CASE OF CUBAN INTERVENTION, SAUDIS, IRAQUIS,
KUWAITIS, AND OTHERS WILL INTERFERE ON THE OTHER
SIDE. THE ISSUE IS VERY SENSITIVE. YUGOSLAVIA GAVE THE
SAME ASSESSMENT RECENTLY TO THE CUBANS AND, DURING MINIC'S
RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW, TO THE SOVIETS.

16. MINIC SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE THIS ISSUE WILL BE RAISED
AT AN ARAB MEETING, BUT COULD NOT BE CERTAIN. HE COULD NOT
ASSESS AT THE MOMENT WHAT SUDAN MAY BE GOING. HAILE SALASSIE
PERSONALLY HELPED NUMAYRI TO CRUSH THE SOUTHERN SUDAN
REBELLION AND THIS CREATED EXCELLENT RELATIONS BETWEEN
ETHIOPIA AND SUDAN. HOWEVER, NUMAYRI MADE SEVERAL MISTAKES--
PARTICULARLY JOINING WITH THE SUDANIS IN TRYING TO PRESSURE
THE ETHIOPIANS. RECENTLY HE HAS CORRECTED MOST OF THESE
BUT IN SUDANESE-ETHIOPIAN RELATIONS MISTRUST LINGERS. TITO
IN HIS RECENT LETTER TO NUMAYRI SAID THAT SUDAN SHOULD
MEDIATE BETWEEN THE EPMG AND THE ERITREAN REBELS. THE
QUESTION REMAINS WHETHER THE EPMG IS DISPOSED TO NEGOTIATE
A SETTLEMENT OR PREFERS TO GO TO WAR. GOY ADVISED "THE
ERITREANS" TO SEEK FEDERATION, BUT THEY WANT ONLY INDEPENDENCE.
REGARDING AN ETHIOPIAN OUTLET TO THE SEA, THE ERITREANS SAY
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THIS SHOULD BE SETTLED BETWEEN "TWO INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES."

17 IT IS IMPORTANT TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS--ONESIDE ASKING FOR INDEPENDENCE, THE OTHER SIDE OFFERING AUTONOMY, AND THEN TRY TO FIND

A COMPROMISE. WAR WILL NOT RESOLVE THE MATTER. ALTHOUGH THE ERITREANS HOLD 95 PERCENT OF THE TERRITORY, ETHIOPIA NOW CAN CONCENTRATE LARGE FORCES IN THE TERRITORY AND CAN SQUEEZE THE ERITREANS. THEY CAN EVEN, AS IN THE CASE ON FRANCE AND ALGERIA, PUSH THE "FREEDOM FIGHTERS" OUT--BUT THEY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO DESTROY THEM AS FRANCE HAS NOT ABLE TO CRUSH THE ALGERIANS.

18. MINIC THEN GOT AROUND TO THE QUESTION OF WHAT THE US MIGHT DO. HE SAID YUGOSLAVIA WAS NOT INCLUDED TO DRAMATIZE EVEN THE MOST SERIOUS SITUATIONS. IF THE EVENTS WERE TAKING PLACE IN THE CENTER OF AFRICA, THE REACTION WOULD BE DIFFERENT. SINCE THEY ARE SO CLOSE TO THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE OIL ROUTE, THE SITUATION IS LINED UP TO BLOC CONFRONTATIONS. IF THE US AND US WERE TO ACHIEVE A BREAKTHROUGH IN THEIR RELATIONS--SOME PROGRESS--THAT ELEMENT COULD PLAY A ROLE IN DIMINISHING THE DANGER. NEVERTHELESS, AN ELEMENT OF DANGER WOULD STILL REMAIN. THAT, SAID MINIC, IS ALL HE COULD SUGGEST.

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19. DURING SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION, AMB DISCUSSED CUBAN ISSUE AND POSSIBLE FURTHER US ACTION WITH ASST FONSECA BERNARDINI AND NORTH AMERICAN DESK DIRECTOR STARCEVIC, LATTER HAVING BEEN PRESENT DURING MINIC. TALK. AMB NOTED THAT ABSENCE OF POSITIVE SUGGESTION BY MINIC APPEARED AS STRONG IMPLICATION THAT US SHOULD REMAIN ON SIDELINES AND NOT INVOLVE ITSELF. STARCEVIC DISAGREED WITH THIS ASSESSMENT, SECRET

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AND BERNARDINI--WHO STATED THAT GOY WAS VERY WORRIED ABOUT CUBAN ACTIVITIES IN ETHIOPIA--AGREED WITH STARCEVIC THAT US, IF SO DISPOSED, SHOULD CONTINUE TO DISCUSS ISSUE DISCREETLY, ALBEIT IN WHATEVER MANNER AND WITH WHOMEVER IT DEEMED APPROPRIATE. NEITHER WOULD BE MORE PRECISE AND DID NOT IMPUTE THEIR VIEWS TO MINIC.

20 DEPTH OF GOY CONCERN MIGHT WELL BE MEASURED BY FACT THAT MINIC, WHO IS TIGHTLY PROGRAMMED AND HAD SET ASIDE HALF HOUR FOR MEETING WITH AMB, ALLOWED SESSION TO CONTINUE FOR MORE THAN AN HOUR.

21. AMB DISCUSSING NAM WITH ASSIST. SEC. KOMATINA TODAY, AMB WILL COMMENT ON MINIC MEETING AFTER HE HEARS FROM

KOMATINA.

EAGLEBURGER UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

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